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ABSTRACT
Section 27 of the South African Constitution guarantees everyone a right of access to 
healthcare services, including reproductive healthcare. This paper discusses how domestic 
courts have interpreted and applied section 27. It explores the extent to which section 
27 is justiciable in the sense of being amenable to judicial interpretation and application 
in practice. The paper highlights the scope as well as the limits of the constitutional and 
institutional competences of the courts to adjudicate a claim relating to the right to health 
that is guaranteed by section 27. The justiciability of the right to health under the South 
African Constitution is interrogated through a critical appraisal of three cases decided by 
the South African Constitutional Court, namely, Soobramoney versus Minister of Health 
KwaZulu-Natal, Minister of Health and Others versus Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others, and Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others versus Grootboom 
and Others against the backdrop of the transformation of the South African constitutional 
landscape in the post-apartheid era.
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RESUMO
Este trabalho discute como as cortes sul-africanas têm interpretado e aplicado o artigo 
27 da Constituição da África do Sul, que garante a todos o direito de acesso aos serviços 
de saúde, incluindo cuidados reprodutivos. A extensão da judicialização do artigo 27 é 
analisada, considerando a possibilidade de interpretação judicial e aplicação prática. 
Destaca-se a abrangência e os limites das competências constitucional e institucional dos 
tribunais para julgar uma ação relacionada ao direito à saúde. A judicialização deste direito 
na Constituição da África do Sul é investigada por meio de uma análise crítica de três 
casos decididos na Corte Constitucional do país: (1) Soobramoney versus Secretaria de 
Saúde de KwaZulu-Natal; (2) Ministro da Saúde e Outros versus Campanha de Tratamento 
e Outros; e (3) Governo da República da África do Sul e Outros versus Grootboom e 
Outros, tendo como pano de fundo a transformação do quadro constitucional sul-africano 
na era pós-apartheid.
Palavras-chave: Competência Constitucional; Competência Institucional; Direito à Saúde; 
Direitos Socioeconômicos; Justiciabilidade.
Introduction
The right to health is among the provisions of the Bill of Rights of the South African 
Constitution. While the right to health manifests in a number of provisions of the 
Constitution, section 27 is its most universal expression. Section 27, which bears 
a close resemblance to article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, (CESCR),(1) provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to have access to:
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themsel-
ves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance.
2. The state must take reasonable and other measures, within 
its available resources, to achieve a progressive realisation 
of each of these rights
3. No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.(2)
This paper seeks to interrogate how the right to health has been judicialised in 
South Africa in the post-apartheid era. It critically appraises the manner in which 
1 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS. GA Res. 
2200A (XXI), adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976.
2 CONSTITUTION of the Republic of South Africa N. 108 of 1996 (hereinafter Constitution). Emphasis 
added.
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courts have adjudicated and conceptualised constitutional claims revolving 
around the right to health. The emphasis is on exploring the scope as well as 
limits of justiciability of the right to health in the South African context. The paper 
uses three leading cases as the main pivot for discussion. All the cases were 
decided by the South African Constitutional Court, the country’s highest court 
on constitutional matters.(3) Two of the cases, namely, Soobramoney v Minister 
of Health KwaZulu-Natal (Soobramoney)(4) and Minister of Health and Others v 
Treatment Action Campaign and Others (TAC),(5) concern claims directly relating 
to a right to health. However, the third case, Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (Grootboom),(6) concerns a right to 
housing rather than health. Notwithstanding that the Grootboom case does not 
directly relate to health, it is the Constitutional Court’s leading decision on the 
interpretation and application of socioeconomic rights under the South African 
Constitution. For this reason, the Grootboom decision is an important source of 
interpretive guidance for lower courts when adjudicating socioeconomic rights 
generally, including the right to health, under domestic law.
Because the concepts of the right to health and justiciability are central to this 
paper, it serves well to begin by clarifying the context in which they are being used.
I. Right to health
At the domestic as well as the international level, the term “right to health” has 
been used not so much as a legal term of art but rather as convenient shorthand. 
When used in international human rights discourses, the term “right to health” can 
be understood in a wider sense to cover not only a right of access to a range of 
facilities, goods and services, including health services, but also a right to the under-
lying determinants of health such as food, housing, safe water, sanitation, healthy 
working conditions, and an environment that is safe and free from hazards such as 
pollutants.(7) In General Comment 14, for example, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Committee on ESCR), said that it interprets the “right 
to health” in article 12 of the CESCR as an “inclusive” right that extends not only to 
access to discrete healthcare services, but also to the underlying determinants of 
health.(8) In this paper, however, right to health is used in a narrower sense to mean 
a legally enforceable right of access to health services for the attainment of health.
3 Section 167(3)(a) of the Constitution.
4 1997 (6) BCLR 78 (Constitutional Court).
5 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (Constitutional Court).
6 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (Constitutional Court).
7 SHINN, Carolynne. The right to the highest attainable standard of health: public health’s opportunity to 
reframe human rights debate in the United States. Health and Human Rights, v. 4, n. 1, p. 119, 1999.
8 COMMITTEE ON ESCR. General Comment No 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of 
health (art 12 of the Covenant) (22n Session 2000), UN Doc E.C 12/2000/4.
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It is otherwise accepted that, when referring to the right to health in the narrower 
sense, other terms such as “right to health care” or the “right to health protection” 
can also be used to convey the notion of individual entitlement to the protection 
of health and provision of health care services under international law and do-
mestic legal systems.(9) Furthermore, it is accepted that irrespective of the term 
that one uses to convey a notion of entitlement to services for attaining health, 
the attainment of health cannot, itself, be guaranteed.(10) The most that the state 
can do is to provide diagnostic, preventative, curative and rehabilitative services 
for the attainment of health.(11)
II. Justiciability
The notion of justiciability in this paper primarily denotes the constitutional 
competence of the courts to adjudicate a claim that seeks to enforce a state 
obligation to provide health service as a correlative duty to a tangible right to 
health that is held by the claimant. To a limited extent, the notion of justiciability 
also implicates the institutional competence of the courts to adjudicate a claim 
based on a right to health. But why is justiciability an important consideration 
when seeking to enforce a right to health?
Criticisms have often been levelled at the notion of a right to health as something 
that is not amenable to justifiability. The criticisms take two main forms. One is to 
do with the normative content of a right to health. In traditional liberalism, there is 
a general discomfiture with socio-economic rights. It is said that unlike traditional 
civil and political rights, a right to health is socio-economic right whose content and 
parameters are not easily ascertainable.(12) It is argued that even if we are to agree 
on the desirability of socio-economic rights, we will still be left with the problems 
of defining in tangible or concrete forms the attendant rights and obligations.(13) 
The argument is that, much more than their civil and political counterparts, socio-
economic rights tend to be nebulous such that individual entitlements as well as 
the corresponding obligations on the part of the state are not clear save where 
state obligations are reduced to procedural fairness such as the obligation to act 
rationally and reasonably or when the obligations are reduced to a bare minimum 
9 TOEBES, Brigit. Towards an improved understanding of the international human right to health. 
Human Rights Quarterly, v. 21, n. 3, p. 661-663, 1999.
10 BUCHANAN, Allan. The right to a decent minimum of health care. Philosophy and Public Affairs, v. 
13, n.1, p. 56, 1984.
11 ROEMER, Ruth. The right to health care. In: FUENZALIDA-PUELMA, Hernán Luis; CONNOR, 
Susan Scholle (Eds.). The right to health in the Americas: a comparative constitutional study. 
Washington DC: PAHO, 1989. p 17-23; TOEBES, Brigit. op. cit., p. 662-663.
12 FELDMAN, David. Civil liberties and human rights in England and Wales. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993. p. 902.
13 PUTA-CHEKWE, Chisanga; FLOOD, Nora. From division to integration: economic. Social and 
cultural rights as basic human rights. In: MERALI, Isefahan; OOSTERVELD, Valerie (Eds.). Giving 
meaning to economic, social and cultural rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
2001. p. 41-43.
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as not to meaningfully contribute to the alleviation of poverty and deprivation.(14) 
This criticism can be described as the problem of normative content.
The second criticism is a more formidable case against the justiciability of the 
right to health. The criticism revolves not so much about the tangibility of so-
cio-economic rights. Rather, it is about judicial competence in two senses. One 
type of competence is judicial competence in a constitutional sense. The second 
type of competence is competence in an institutional sense. The argument is that 
historical deficits in both constitutional and institutional competence interact at 
different levels and with differing intensity to render it difficult, if not impossible, 
for courts to claim to command the same constitutional and institutional com-
petences to hear and resolve disputes about socio-economic rights that courts 
command in respect of disputes involving civil and political rights.
The problem of constitutional competence is really the problem of separation of 
powers between the judiciary and the executive. The right to health, as a socio-
economic right, implicates the doctrine of separation of powers that was popula-
rised by Montesquieu in the eighteenth century.(15) The problem of constitutional 
competence, when exploring the justiciability of the right to health, is not because 
socio-economic rights impact on separation of powers, at all. It is accepted that 
even civil and political rights impact on separation of powers. Civil and political rights 
claims that come before the courts can be as much about law as they are about 
policy which, constitutionally, is pre eminently the preserve of the executive. Rather, 
when we raise the problem of constitutional competence, the important question is 
whether socio-economic rights do not upset the doctrine of separation of powers 
to a point where the judiciary begins to substantively involve itself in the day to day 
allocation budgets and thus rivaling if not usurping the constitutional prerogative 
of the executive. What is constitutionally problematic about socioeconomic rights 
is that they implicate a positive and enforceable commitment of resources by the 
state to a much greater degree than their civil and political counterparts. Ultimately, 
socioeconomic rights obligations are about the state committing significant and 
often substantial financial resources in order to fulfil certain rights.
When seeking to uphold separation of powers in liberal democracies, the under-
lying political and constitutional tenets are that budgets are subject to democratic 
control and accountability. Consequently, in a democratic polity, it would be illegiti-
mate for a body that is not subject to the same degree of control and accountability 
to the electorate, such as the judiciary, to substitute its own view of the public 
good for that of the executive. In short, without a clear constitutional mandate, 
courts are in troubled waters when it comes to adjudicating on socio-economic 
rights. Even where there is there is a constitutional mandate, courts may have 
14 BUCHANAN, Allan. op. cit.
15 MONTESQUIEU. The spirit of the laws 1748. Available at: <http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/
public/MonLaws.html>.
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to be restrained about their own competence in order not to appear to be ready 
to substitute the executive, or worse still, usurp it.(16)
By raising institutional competence, we are also saying that even if there is con-
stitutional competence, there is the problem of polycentricity to contend with.(17) 
The question is whether courts have the ability, institutional memory and expertise 
to decide on allocation of health care resources within health care and between 
health care and other spheres. Given the adversarial nature of adjudication we 
have, the task of the court is, ultimately, to weigh up the arguments it has heard 
from the two contending parties and then find in favour of one – the winner. It is 
a winner takes all. But does this approach sit well with socioeconomic rights?
Socioeconomic rights, including the right to health, however, militate against 
always making clear choices between two opposing arguments. More pertinently, 
it is argued, that decisions about allocation for health care resources, for exam-
ple, often entail reconciling mutually interacting variables rather choosing one 
goal and the exclusion of the other. Within health care itself there are difficult 
choices to be made, for example, between acute and chronic care.(18) Outside of 
health care, choices have to be made about how resources allocated to health 
care stand alongside those allocated to social welfare expenditure, defence, 
education and so on. It was the American scholar, Lon Fuller, who first gave us 
a classic statement on the limitations of the judicial function when attempting to 
resolve polycentric questions.(19) Using the metaphor of a spider’s web, he said:
We may visualise this kind of situation by thinking of a spider’s web. 
A pull on one strand will distribute the tensions after a complica-
ted pattern throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original 
pull will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting 
tensions but will rather create a different complicated pattern of 
tensions. This would occur for example, if the double pull caused 
one or more of the weaker strands to snap. This is a “polycentric” 
situation because it is “many centered” – each crossing of a strand 
is a distinct centre for distributing tension.(20)
The argument is not that civil and political rights do not give rise to polycentric 
questions at all. Rather, it is that socioeconomic rights such as the right to health 
are inherently polycentric to the point of rendering a right to health a highly prob-
lematic claim in adversarial proceedings.
16 This observation was made, for example, by the South African Constitutional Court in MINISTER of 
Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (Constitutional 
Court), which is discussed in this paper.
17 FULLER, Lon Luvois. The forms and limits of adjudication. Harvard Law Review, v. 92, n. 2, p. 353-
409, Dec. 1978.
18 This observation was made, for example, by the South African Constitutional Court in 
SOOBRAMONEY v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal (Soobramoney) 1997 (6) BCLR 78 
(Constitutional Court), which is discussed in this paper.
19 FULLER, Lon Luvois. op. cit., p. 395.
20 Id., loc. cit.
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There are counterarguments, of course, not least the argument that while it is true that 
at the time that socioeconomic rights first entered modern human rights jurisprudence 
there were huge problems about their ascertainability and the institutional capacity 
of the courts to adjudicate on socio-economic rights, over the years there been 
tremendous conceptual and interpretive progress made by a variety stakeholders, in-
cluding by scholars, treaty bodies, and domestic courts.(21) Yes, socioeconomic rights 
are second generation rights. Yes, we must concede that they are not as juridically 
developed as their civil and political counterparts and that their normative content is 
not as clear. At the same time, we must take cognisance that for a growing number 
of jurisdictions as well as in international human rights discourse, socioeconomic 
rights are no longer rights in their infancy. The real question is whether in a given 
case a jurisdiction has juridically agreed to be bound by socio-economic rights, and 
whether there is judicial as well as political willingness to fulfil socio-economic rights.
The work done by international law experts that culminated in the Limburg 
Principles in 1986(22) and the Maastricht Guidelines in 1997(23) on clarifying the 
normative content of the CESCR, and developing criteria for identifying violations 
of socio-economic rights and the appropriate in the domestic legal spheres, is 
evidence of a growing jurisprudence on socioeconomic rights. The jurisprudence 
of the Committee on ESCR, especially jurisprudence emanating from its General 
Comments, has contributed significantly towards clarifying and underscoring 
the justiciability of socioeconomic rights. In this regard, General Comment 14 of 
the Committee on ESCR is an important milestone.(24) Though the justiciability 
of socioeconomic rights remains a contested terrain, what stands in the way of 
recognition and implementation of socioeconomic rights is no longer necessarily 
the limitation of jurisprudence on justiciability, but rather problems of judicial as 
well as political resolve.
III.  South African experience with justiciability of the right to health: the 
background
South Africa provides us with an ideal jurisdiction in which to test the justiciability 
of the right to health for four main interrelated reasons Firstly, South African has a 
transformative Constitution. The second reason is the commitment to substantive 
equality under the Constitution. The third reason is the premium that the Consti-
tution puts on the respect of human dignity as a concomitant part of respecting 
21 LIEBENBERG, Sandra. Socio-economic rights: adjudication under a transformative constitution. 
Claremont: Juta, 2010. p. 83-86.
22 LIMBURG Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. UN Document E.CN.4/1987/17, 1987. The Limburg Principles were developed 
under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists.
23 MAASTRICHT Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Human Rights 
Quarterly, v. 20, n. p. 691-705, 1998. The Maastricht Guidelines were also developed under the 
auspices of the International Commission of Jurists.
24 COMMITTEE ON ESCR. General Comment No 14, cit.
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equality. The fourth reason is the explicit recognition of socio-economic rights, 
including the right to health as enforceable fundamental rights.
The inauguration of a new constitution to mark the demise of the iniquitous and 
brutish apartheid system and the birth of a new political dispensation was in 
constitutional terms a great leap. Not only did the new Constitution inscribe into 
the political and legal economy of the country a new culture of human rights by 
ushering in a justiciable Bill of Rights built around the democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom which the state has a duty to respect, protect, pro-
mote and fulfil.(25) Equally significant, the Constitution went beyond the classical 
liberal promise of merely protecting individual liberties against the tyranny of the 
state by creating, as part of recognising the history of oppressive, exclusionary 
and, fractious human relations in the country, a space for transformative consti-
tutionalism.(26) Karl Klare has described transformative constitutionalism under 
the South African Constitution as “a long-term project of constitutional enactment, 
interpretation, and enforcement committed to transforming a country’s political 
and social institutions and power relationships in democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction”.(27) The transformative nature of the South African Consti-
tution is an important normative feature of the South African Constitution as it 
provides a context in which to interpret socioeconomic rights as rights that are 
intended to transcend the classical libertarian idea of a Bill of Rights as essentially 
a bastion against the state where fundamental rights are essentially rights to 
restrain the state rather than positive entitlements that impose positive duties.(28)
The substantive equality orientation of the South African Constitution manifests 
in a number of ways. One manifestation is the historical situatedness of equality 
in the constitutional universe. To underpin the place of equality in the new con-
stitutional dispensation, the Constitutional Court has said:
The South African Constitution is primarily and emphatically an 
egalitarian Constitution. The supreme laws of comparable states 
may underscore their principles and rights. But in the light of our 
own particular history, and our vision for the future, a Constitution 
was written with equality at its centre. Equality is our Constitution’s 
focus and its organising principle.(29)
25 Section 7(2) of the Constitution.
26 KLARE, Karl. Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism. South African Journal on Human 
Rights, v. 14, n. 1, p. 146-188, 1998; MOSENEKE, Dikgang. The fourth bram fischer memorial lecture: 
transformative adjudication. South African Journal on Human Rights, v. 18, n. 3, p. 309-319, 2002; 
PIETERSE, Marius. What do we mean when we talk about transformative constitutionalism? SA Public 
Law, v. 20, n. 2, p. 156-166, 2005; LANGA, Pius. Transformative constitutionalism. Stellenbosch Law 
Review, v. 22, n. 3, p. 351-360, 2006; ALBERTYN, Cathi. Substantive equality and transformation in 
South Africa. South African Journal on Human Rights, v. 23, n. 2, p. 253-276, 2007.
27 KLARE, Karl. op. cit., p. 150.
28 FREDMAN, Sandra. Human rights transformed: positive rights and positive duties. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. p. 10-13.
29 PRESIDENT of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (Constitutional 
Court), para. 74.
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The most important manifestation is the departure from formal equality. The right 
to equality, which finds its most direct expression in section 9 of the Constitution, 
means much more than merely ensuring formal equality. The equality clause goes 
beyond the Aristotelian or equal treatment model. It extends to imposing positive 
obligations on the state to create conditions for achieving equality of opportunity 
and possibly equality of outcome. In contemporary South African jurisprudence, 
the term substantive equality has come to signify an expansive notion of equality 
under the Constitution.(30) It is a model of equality whose main premise is derived 
from a recognition that in the particular historical circumstances of South Africa, 
the pattern of disadvantage that was spawned and entrenched by colonialism 
and apartheid, imposes a legal obligation on the part of the state to redress 
underlying structural inequality so as to remove barriers to meaningful equality, 
promote equal participation in the social and economic spheres, and secure full 
and equal enjoyment of the fundamental rights that are inscribed in the Bill of 
Rights. If the rationale of socio-economic rights is creating a minimum floor of 
socio-economic wellbeing, then substantive equality is its foundational lynchpin 
for socioeconomic rights along with respect for human dignity.
An understanding of the reach of equality under the South African Constitution would 
be incomplete without concomitantly understanding how the Constitutional Court 
has forged a link between the right to equality in section 9 and the right to human 
dignity in section 10 of the Constitution. The section provides that: “Everyone has 
inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected”. Human 
dignity, like equality, operates as a pervasive value as well as a right under the 
South African Constitution. While the Constitutional Court concedes the difficulties 
of giving tangible content to human dignity, at the same time, in several cases, the 
Court has been quite emphatic that human dignity is inextricably intertwined with 
equality.(31) In these cases, the Court has highlighted that the right to human dignity 
is an acknowledgment that all human beings have intrinsic worth and none more 
than the other. Equality under the South African Constitution does not countenance 
distinctions that treat certain people as “second class” citizens.(32) Consequently every 
human being is entitled to equal worth, respect and concern. Socio-economic rights 
affirm human dignity by alleviating the consequences of poverty and deprivation.(33)
30 See, for example, the pronouncements of the Constitutional Court in the following cases: 
PRESIDENT of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo, cit., para 41; NATIONAL Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (Constitutional Court), para 60-62; 
CITY Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (Constitutional Court), para 46; MINISTER of 
Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC) 2004 (6) SA 26 (Constitutional Court), para 26.
31 See, for example, the pronouncements of the Constitutional Court in the following cases: 
PRESIDENT of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo, cit., para 41; HARKSEN v Lane 
NO and Others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (Constitutional Court), para 50; CITY Council of Pretoria v 
Walker, cit., para 81; NATIONAL Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice, cit., 
para 120-129; MINISTER of Finance v Van Heerden, cit., para 116.
32 MINISTER of Finance v Van Heerden, cit., para 116.
33 LIEBENBERG, Sandra. The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights. South 
African Journal on Human Rights, v. 21, n. 1, p. 1-31, 2005.
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Prior to the inauguration of the Constitution, there was much debate as to whether 
socio-economic rights should be guaranteed as part of the Bill of Rights. In the end, 
the wishes of the African National Congress, the majority political party, to have 
a Bill of Rights that would reflect the indivisibility and interdependence of human 
rights, as part of overcoming the legacy of apartheid, prevailed and socio-economic 
rights became part of the Bill of Rights. In the Grootboom case, which is discussed 
in the next section, the Constitutional Court made the following pronouncement by 
way of taking juridical notice of the rationale of socio-economic rights:
Our Constitution entrenches both civil and political rights and 
social and economic rights. All the rights in our Bill of Rights are 
inter-related and mutually supporting. There can be no doubt that 
human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of our 
society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter. 
Affording socio-economic rights to all people therefore enables 
them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in Chapter 2.(34)
In Khosa versus Minister for Social Development,(35) the Constitutional Court drew 
a link between socioeconomic rights, equality and human dignity. It underscored 
that when fulfilling the fundamental rights of individuals under the Constitution, 
socioeconomic rights, and rights to equality and human dignity are not atomis-
tic rights but rather are interrelated and reinforce each other.(36) As part of the 
commitment to transforming the legacy of apartheid and achieving substantive 
equality and human dignity, the South African Constitution contains a host of 
socio-economic rights in its Bill of Rights, including section 27 which guarantees 
everyone a right to access health services.(37)
IV. The Soobramoney, Grootboom and Tac cases
This section uses the Soobramoney, Grootboom, and TAC cases to test the 
justiciability of the right to health under South African law. The cases are, by no 
means, the only relevant cases as they have been other cases that have raised 
socioeconomic rights. However, because the cases are widely regarded as 
leading cases, they are sufficiently illustrative of the possibilities as well as the 
constraints of judicialising the right to health.
34 GOVERNMENT of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (Constitutional Court), para 26.
35 KHOSA and Others: Mahlaule and Others v Minister for Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 
(Constitutional Court).
36 Id. Ibid., paras 40-43.
37 The other socioeconomic rights apart from the right of access to health care services are right to: 
an environment that is not harmful to one’s health or well-being (section 24); land (section 30); 
adequate housing (section 26); emergency treatment (section 27(3); sufficient food (section 27(1)
(b); sufficient water (section 27(1)(b); social security (section 27(1)(c); basic nutrition, shelter, basic 
health care services and social services in respect of children; basic and further education (section 
29(1)(a) and (b); adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment in 
respect of incarcerated persons (section 35(2)(e).
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1. Soobramoney
1.1. Facts and decision
The applicant, a 41-year-old man, was in a critical condition with chronic renal 
failure. He would otherwise die if he did not receive treatment in the form of re-
nal dialysis. He had been receiving dialysis through private care, but his funds 
had run out. He sought to have dialysis provided to him at the expense of the 
state. He approached a renal unit of a state hospital. Although such treatment 
was available, his request was declined on the ground that he did not meet the 
medical criteria for dialysis.
The medical criteria for determining eligibility for renal dialysis at the expense of 
the State had been designed to reconcile scarce state resources for supplying 
kidney dialysis with the demand for kidney dialysis. The demand for kidney 
dialysis far outstripped supply by state health providers. The criteria took the 
form of guidelines that had been drawn by the renal unit and were, in turn, based 
on national guidelines drawn up by the Department of Health. The criteria were 
designed to ration state renal dialysis services by giving priority to patients in 
acute renal failure who needed only short-term dialysis while waiting for a more 
long-term solution such as a kidney transplant or some other appropriate treat-
ment. In this instance, the applicant had irreversible renal disease and would 
not, in the long run, be a suitable candidate for renal transplantation. Moreover, 
the applicant suffered from ischaemic heart disease and was a diabetic with 
peripheral vascular disease. In the previous year, he had suffered a stroke. 
He needed life-long dialysis. Such a medical history and the need for life-long 
dialysis placed the applicant well outside the inclusion criteria for eligibility for 
dialysis in the public health sector.
At first, the applicant applied to the High Court for an order to quash the decision 
of the state renal unit and compel the unit to provide renal dialysis. The matter 
was first heard in chambers, but the application was refused. The matter was 
then set for trial before Justice Combrink as an urgent application for final relief. 
Though the applicant canvassed several grounds in support of his application, 
in the main, he contended that the respondent’s decision had infringed his 
constitutional right to life and right not to be refused emergency medical treat-
ment that were guaranteed by section 11 and section 27(3) of the Constitution 
respectively.(38) The application was not successful.
On the question of whether section 27(3) assisted the patient, Justice Combrink 
was of the view that it did not and for two reasons. Firstly, the section could not 
be interpreted in a vacuum, but in the context of limited resources. Emergency 
38 The applicant also argued that refusal of treatment was unjust, discriminatory and an infringement 
of his constitutional right to human dignity contrary to section 9 and section 10 of the Constitution, 
respectively.
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treatment meant treatment that was possible and available. It could not have been 
the legislature’s intention to impose a duty to provide treatment regardless of cost. 
In this case, cost was a prohibiting factor. Secondly, even if cost was not relevant, 
chronic disease such as the applicant was afflicted with, did not merit emergency 
treatment. Emergency treatment envisaged sudden illness or unexpected trauma 
but not a chronic condition that had been extant for many years and had eventually 
reached a stage where it would cause the sufferer to die within a few days.
In a unanimous judgment, the Constitutional Court upheld the decision for, more or 
less, the same reasons as Justice Combrink. Justice Chaskalson (then President 
of the Constitutional Court), delivered the leading judgment and Justices Madala 
and Sachs the supporting judgments. On the construction of section 27(3), Justice 
Chaskalson took the view that although the section was capable of a broader 
meaning to cover on-going treatment for chronic illnesses for the purpose of 
prolonging life, it had a narrower meaning. It meant treatment that was designed 
to avert a sudden occurrence for which the patient did not anticipate and had no 
opportunity to make contingent arrangements.(39) Section 27(3) was designed for 
a sudden catastrophe that calls for immediate medical attention. According to 
Justice Chaskalson, a broader interpretation was, in any event, untenable as it 
would make it substantially more difficult for the state to fulfill its obligations under 
section 27(1) and section 27(2). These sections oblige the State to provide health 
care services to everyone within its available resources. If adopted, the appellant’s 
construction would have the consequences of prioritising the treatment of terminal 
illnesses over other forms of care. It would reduce the resources available to the 
State for other purposes such as preventative health care and medical treatment for 
persons suffering from illnesses or bodily infirmities which are not life threatening.(40)
With respect to the right to life argument, Justice Chaskalson distinguished 
an Indian case, Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity versus State of West 
Bengal,(41) on which the appellant had relied. In that case, various hospitals had 
refused to attend to a patient who had suffered trauma and was haemorrhaging 
as a result of falling from a train. Ostensibly, the patient had been turned away 
on the grounds that the hospitals were too full. In fact, the patient could have 
been accommodated. It was held by the Supreme Court of India that failure on 
the part of a State hospital to provide the patient with timely treatment was a 
violation of his right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. According 
to Justice Chaskalson, in the Indian case, the patient was precisely faced with 
an emergency and urgent treatment was clearly necessary. This was unlike the 
present case where the patient was suffering from a chronic condition. Moreover, 
Justice Chaskalson was of the opinion that since the South African Constitution, 
unlike its Indian counterpart, contained specific provisions on access to health 
39 SOOBRAMONEY v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal, cit., paras 13-18.
40 Id. Ibid., para 19.
41 (1996) AIR SC 2426.
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care, the case would be primarily resolved by applying provisions of section 27 
rather than drawing inference from s11.(42)
In short, Justice Chaskalson was of the view that reliance upon section 11 and 
section 27(3) of the Constitution was misconceived. The more appropriate grounds 
were section 27(1) and section 27(2) taken together. The sections entitle everyone 
to have access to health care services. However, the obligations imposed on the 
Constitution by the state necessarily depended on the corresponding resources as 
evidenced by the limitation in section 27(2). Allocations of health care resources 
involved executive choices. The choices involved difficult decisions that had to be 
taken at a political level. The court would be slow to interfere with rational decisions 
taken in good faith by political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility 
it is to deal with such matters.(43) According to the Constitutional Court, this was 
a case where, as the trial judge had found, no funds were available to meet the 
needs of an applicant who was outside the medical criteria set by the unit.
In their supporting judgments, both Justices Madala and Sachs agreed with 
Justice Chalkalson that section 27(3) did not assist the patient as he was suf-
fering from a chronic condition. Though both judges, unlike Justice Chaskalson, 
appeared to entertain the relevance of the right to life argument (section 11 of 
the Constitution), nevertheless, came to the conclusion that, where resources 
were scarce and demand outstripped supply, that right was necessarily limited. 
According to Justice Sachs, where scarce artificial life-prolonging resources 
had to be called upon, tragic medical choices had to be made as in this case.(44) 
Moreover, courts were not the proper place to resolve the agonising personal 
and medical problems underlying such choices.(45) Justice Madala went as far 
as saying that though the Constitution guaranteed many rights, some rights 
were best regarded as aspirations rather that rights in stricto sensu on account 
of their unattainability.(46)
1.2. Analysis
Notwithstanding that socioeconomic rights, including the right to health, are 
unambiguously inscribed in the South African Bill of Rights, the approach of 
the Constitutional Court in Soobramoney paradoxically seems to make a case 
against for the proponents of the argument that courts lack the constitutional and 
institutional competence to decide on allocation of health care resources. The 
shortcoming is not with the outcome of the case as such. The decision itself was 
correct given the prevailing scarcity of resources to provide lifelong renal dialysis 
at a time that the state health sector could meet only 30 per cent of the demand 
42 SOOBRAMONEY v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal, cit., para 15.
43 Id. Ibid., para 29.
44 Id. Ibid., para 57.
45 Id. Ibid., para 58.
46 Id. Ibid., para 42.
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for renal dialysis. Under the guidelines that had been worked out by the state 
renal unit priority was given to patients who were candidates for renal transplant 
and, thus, did not require life-long dialysis. In this case, the applicant was in 
chronic renal failure. On account of his poor medical history and prognosis, he 
was not a candidate for a kidney transplant. Instead, he required life-long dialysis.
The shortcoming with Soobramoney is that the Constitutional Court seemed 
to envisage an unduly limited role for the courts in decisions on allocation of 
health care resources and in the protection of socio-economic rights in general. 
The Court seemed to take as its starting point, that once it is asserted by the 
state that resources are unavailable, then that per se limits the realisation of a 
right of access to the service sought. The Court’s approach has the unfortunate 
consequence of making socio-economic rights wholly depend on, rather than 
inform, executive policy, has much cogency.(47) There is no promise in the judg-
ment that the Court would be keen to inquire into whether the state was in fact 
according due priority to the realisation of the right sought, by making available 
resources that ought to be available and utilising such resources effectively. It 
seems enough for the health care provider to “toll the bell of tight resources”.(48)
The task of the Court seems to have been limited to conducting judicial review 
in the traditional sense and inquire only into the form rather than the substance 
of the decision to ensure that it is taken without bias, after weighing all relevant 
factors and excluding all extraneous factors- the so-called rationality test. Ul-
timately, what is intended to be a justiciable right may unwittingly be whittled 
down to the status of a directive principle which is merely exhortatory rather than 
peremptory. The suggestion by Justice Madala, for example, that socioeconomic 
rights be understood as aspirations rather than proper legal rights supports 
this inference.(49) Moreover, what is missing from Soobramoney is a systematic 
approach to the determination of a socioeconomic right and a clear articulation 
of the normative content of the right to health care services.
Soobramoney did not really lay down any guidelines that could be followed when 
interpreting socio-economic rights so as to illuminate and indigenise jurispru-
dence on socio-economic rights, and also guide lower courts with jurisdiction 
to determine constitutional matters. The Court did not consider how the right to 
health or the right of access to health care has been interpreted under interna-
tional human rights instruments. In particular, the Court failed to make use of 
jurisprudence that has been developed by the Committee on ESCR. Thus, whilst 
the Court arrived at the correct conclusion, its approach fell short of advancing a 
fuller juridical landscape of the justiciability of socio-economic rights.
47 MOLLENDORF, Darrel. Reasoning about resources: Soobramoney and the future of economic 
rights claims. South African Journal on Human Rights, v. 14, n. 2, p 332, 1998.
48 R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex Pb (a minor) (QBD) 25 BMLR 5, 17, per Laws J.
49 SOOBRAMONEY v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal, cit., para 42.
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2. Grootboom
2.1. Facts and decision
The respondents had been rendered homeless as a result of being evicted from 
informal homes that they had erected on land earmarked by the state for formal 
low-cost housing. They had applied to the High Court for an order requiring the 
state or its organs to provide them with basic shelter adequate housing, or in 
the alternative basic shelter relying upon sections 26 and 28 of the Constitution, 
respectively. Section 26(1) guarantees everyone a right of access to adequate 
housing while section 28(1)(c), inter alia, guarantees children a right to shelter. 
The respondents had succeeded on the section 28 argument but not on section 
26. On appeal, the Constitutional Court reversed the order of success, as it were. 
The Constitutional Court held that the appellants were in breach of the state’s 
obligation in section 26(2) of the Constitution. Section 26(2) requires the state to 
take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the right to have access to adequate hous-
ing that is guaranteed to everyone by section 26(1). Section 26(2) is analogous 
to section 27(2) of the Constitution which was relevant in the Soobramoney case.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court considered international human rights 
jurisprudence and drew particular assistance from the provisions of the CESCR 
and their interpretation by the Committee on ESCR. It made use of General 
Comment 3 which explains the normative content of article 2(1) of the CESCR 
and the attendant state obligations.(50) It is in part on account of the systematic 
approach adopted by the Committee on CESR in General Comment 3 that the 
Court was able to disentangle section 26(2) of the Constitution into three main 
elements, namely: “reasonable legislative and other measures”; “progressive 
realisation of the right”; and “within its available resources”. The Court then eval-
uated, step by step, the state housing programme against the three benchmarks.
The Court noted that though, the state’s housing programme was genuine and 
commendable in many respects, nonetheless, it lacked balance and flexibility. It 
tended to cater for medium and long-term needs only and was, thus, unable to 
respond to the immediate, short-term needs of those in crisis and most desper-
ate.(51) In part drawing from General Comment 3, the Court observed that whilst 
use of the term “progressive realisation” shows that it was not contemplated that 
the right would be realised immediately, at the same time, it did not mean not doing 
anything. The state has to take steps, including legal, administrative, operational 
and financial steps, towards ensuring that accessibility is progressively facilitated.(52) 
50 COMMITTEE ON ESCR, General Comment No 3, The nature of state obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1 of 
the Covenant) 1990. Doc. No. E/1991/23.
51 GOVERNMENT of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, cit., para 44, 
52, 65-68.
52 Id. Ibid., para 45.
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The Court concluded that the state was not meeting the obligations imposed by 
section 26(2) in that it had not made provision for relief to the categories of peo-
ple in desperate need within its available resources. The Government had failed 
to come up with a framework for a comprehensive, co-ordinated and workable 
plan. The Court emphasised that a well-intentioned programme would not pass 
constitutional muster if it lacked reasonableness. In this regard, the Court said:
The State is required to take reasonable legislative and other mea-
sures. (…) The State is obliged to act to achieve the intended result, 
and the legislative measures will invariably have to be supported by 
appropriate, well-directed policies and programmes implemented by 
the executive. These policies and programmes must be reasonable 
both in their conception and their implementation (…) An otherwise 
reasonable programme that is not implemented reasonably will not 
constitute compliance with the State’s obligations.(53)
The Court issued a declaratory order. The order set out the shortcomings of the 
government programme and suggested rather than directed means of remedying 
the shortcomings. It did not indicate, for example, what type of shelter govern-
ment should built, but left it to government to decide. The Court appointed the 
South African Human Rights Commission to monitor implementation of the order.
2.2. Analysis
What is instructive about Grootboom is not so much the outcome of the case but 
the approach adopted by the Court to determine the right to housing, especially 
the role of international law as a symbiotic aid to constitutional interpretation. The 
approach of the Constitutional Court in Grootboom, unlike its approach in the 
Soobramoney case, confirms rather than puts in the balance the justiciability of 
socio-economic rights. The thorough and systematic approach adopted by the 
Constitutional Court in Grootboom confirms that once the constitution is enabling, 
courts can muster not only the constitutional competence but equally significant, 
the institutional competence to adjudicate socioeconomic rights claims.
But whilst finding for the respondents, the Court refused to conceive socio-eco-
nomic rights as requiring the state to fulfil a “core minimum obligation” in line with 
the jurisprudence of the Committee on ESCR.(54) The rationale behind the core 
minimum is that if states are given carter blanche discretion, they may easily 
shield behind progressive realization and do little even to fulfil the survival needs 
of those that are most vulnerable and most desperate. In practical terms, the 
advantage of a minimum core approach is that whilst socio-economic rights are 
progressively realizable, there is a part of them that is immediately realizable. 
Without shutting the door the Constitutional Court said that it would need suffi-
cient information first before it can proceed to hold that there is such a minimum.
53 GOVERNMENT of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, cit., para 42.
54 Id. Ibid., paras 32-33; COMMITTEE ON ESCR, General Comment No 3, cit., para 10.
59Judicialisation of the right to health in South Africa
R. Dir. sanit., São Paulo, v. 14, n. 2, p. 43-87, jul./out. 2013
In rejecting the minimum core approach, the Court effectively conceded the 
problem of institutional competence when adjudicating polycentric rights. The 
Constitutional Court said:
It is not possible to determine the minimum threshold for the progres-
sive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing without 
first identifying the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of 
such a right. These will vary according to factors such as income, 
unemployment, availability of land and poverty. The differences 
between city and rural communities will also determine the needs 
and opportunities for the enjoyment of this right. Variations ultimately 
depend on the economic and social history and circumstances of a 
country. All this illustrates the complexity of the task of determining a 
minimum core obligation for the progressive realisation of the right of 
access to adequate housing without having the requisite information 
on the needs and the opportunities for the enjoyment of this right. 
The committee developed the concept of minimum core over many 
years of examining reports by reporting states. This Court does not 
have comparable information.(55)
The reluctance of the Court to concede the “minimum core” when mapping the 
normative content of socioeconomic rights demonstrates that courts concede that 
even where there is constitutional competence, they will exercise self-restraint 
where they are lacking in institutional competence to adjudicate a particular 
socioeconomic rights claim.
3. TAC
3.1. Facts and decision
The applicants had challenged the decision of government to confine the dis-
pensation of nevirapine to 18 pilot sites only (two in each the country’s nine 
provinces) for the purpose of prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV 
(PMTCT). The main argument of the applicants was that the government’s failure 
to provide universal access to antiretroviral therapy in the public health sector to 
prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV, constituted a series of breaches of 
provisions of the Constitution, including section 27 which guarantees everyone 
a right of access to health services.
The reasons why government had confined nevirapine to the 18 sites are two-fold. 
Firstly, government had reservations about the safety of nevirapine. It wished to 
monitor the possible side-effects of nevirapine. Secondly, government wished to 
study the social, economic and public health implications of providing a nationwide 
programme. This was with a view to enabling government to develop and monitor 
human and material resources for the provision of a comprehensive package, 
55 GOVERNMENT of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, cit., paras 32.
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including the following services: voluntary testing and counselling; follow-up 
services; provision of formula milk where it is substituted for breast-feeding; 
and provision of antibiotics and vitamin supplements. Thus the pilot sites were 
intended to serve the purpose of monitoring safety and generating information for 
developing capacity for the best prevention programme that would eventually be 
extended to all public facilities. However, government did not indicate as to when 
the programme would be extended to hospitals and clinics outside the pilot sites.
The applicants were successful before the High Court. The Constitutional Court 
upheld the decision of the High Court but modified the order. Applying the prin-
ciples it had formulated in Grootboom for the determination of socio-economic 
rights, the Court held that while government was better placed than the courts to 
formulate and implement policy on HIV, including measures for PMTCT, it had, 
nonetheless, failed to adopt a reasonable measure to achieve the progressive 
realisation of the right of access to health care services in accordance with section 
27(2) read with section 27(1). The decision to confine nevirapine to the 18 pilot 
sites was unreasonable and thus constituted a breach of the state’s obligations 
under sections 27(1) and (2) to the extent that it was rigid and inflexible.(56) The 
policy denied mothers and babies, outside the pilot sites, the opportunity of 
receiving a potentially life-saving drug that could have been administered within 
the available resources of the state. According to the Court, the reasons given 
by government to justify limiting its nevirapine programme to the pilot sites had 
failed to distinguish between the need to evaluate a programme for PMTCT, and 
the need to provide access to health care services required by those who did 
not have access to the pilot sites.(57)
The Court also indicated, albeit implicitly, that it would have reached the same 
conclusion had the matter been determined according to the state’s obligation 
under section 28 of the Constitution.(58) The section, inter alia, guarantees every 
child a right to basic health services. In the Court’s view, the provision of nevirapine 
to prevent transmission of HIV could be considered as ‘essential’ to the child. The 
needs of the children were ‘most urgent’. The right conferred on children by section 
28 had been endangered by the state’s rigid and inflexible policy which excluded 
children outside the pilot sites from having access to nevirapine.(59) Moreover, the 
children concerned were on the whole born to mothers who were indigent and 
relied on public health sector facilities as private care was beyond their means.
By way of remedy, the Court modified the order of the High Court, and in essence 
ordered government without delay to:
•	 remove the restrictions that prevent nevirapine from being made available 
for the purpose of PMTCT at public health facilities outside the pilot sites;
56 MINISTER of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others, cit., para 95. 
57 Id. Ibid., paras 67-68. 
58 Id. Ibid. para 78.
59 Id. loc. cit.
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•	 permit, facilitate and expedite use of nevirapine for PMTCT at public health 
facilities when in the judgment of the attending medical practitioner acting 
in consultation with the medical superintendent of the facility nevirapine is 
medically indicated, and if necessary, the mother concerned has been ap-
propriately tested and counselled; and
•	 make provision if necessary for training of counsellors for counselling for 
PMTCT outside the pilot sites.
3.2. Analysis
Whilst the order was prescriptive, the Court said that government had the dis-
cretion to adapt the order if equally appropriate or better methods for PMTCT 
became available. The remedy that was ordered by the Constitutional Court 
seems proportionate to the rights and interests that were at stake. Section 38 
of the Constitution empowers the court to grant “appropriate relief” where a 
fundamental right has been infringed. Section 172 gives the court competence 
to declare invalid any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution, to 
make any order that is “just and equitable”. The Court could have declared that 
the government’s pilot sites were a violation of sections 27(1) and (2), but with-
out necessarily prescribing a particular response on the part of the government. 
However, such a course would not have sufficiently vindicated that what was at 
stake was not only the protection of health, but also the protection of life. It was 
right, therefore, for the Court to specify the result that would be just and equita-
ble, namely not merely planning, but also implementing a universal programme 
for access to a nevirapine-based programme for preventing mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV. This was a case where the Court seemed convinced that 
nothing less than a targeted measure would remedy the injustice. At the same 
time, there was sufficient flexibility in the order, to the extent that government 
was given discretion to substitute its own measures for those of the court if 
those measures were equally efficacious in meeting the urgent need for access 
to antiretroviral therapy for PMTCT.
The Court’s approach might be criticized for appearing to sit uneasily with the 
traditional doctrine of separation of powers. The Court’s order was, in substance, 
prescriptive of policy and, to some extent, had budgetary implications. The order 
effectively amounted to an unelected judiciary countermanding a democratic 
government’s own HIV/AIDS strategy for the country, thus encroaching on policy 
and economic issues that are traditionally the preserve of the executive. However 
as the Court observed, by providing for socioeconomic rights, the Constitution 
was at the same time conferring competence on judges over matters that will 
frequently have budgetary implications. The Constitutional Court was at pains 
not to be seen as violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The explicitly 
acknowledged the superior position that the executive has over matters of policy 
and budgetary appropriations when it said:
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It should be borne in mind that in dealing with such matters courts 
are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual 
and political enquiries…nor for deciding how public revenues 
should most effectively be spent. There are many pressing de-
mands on the public purse.(60)
As in Grootboom, the Court in TAC also refused to concede to the “minimum 
core” arguments for the same reasons the Court gave in Grootboom.(61)
Concluding remarks
The justiciability of the right to health should be understood as something much 
more than the mere inscription of this right in a domestic constitution. A better 
understanding of the justiciability of the right to health comes from appreciating 
how courts with the constitutional competence to adjudicate the right to health 
develop the requisite institutional competence to adjudicate the right to health 
within a constitutional paradigm in which the doctrine of separation of powers 
is a check and balance on the relationship between organs of state. The South 
African Constitutional Court has affirmed, as it should, the justiciability of the right 
to health which is clearly inscribed in the Constitution. It has begun to develop 
institutional competence for adjudicating the right to health.
Though Soobramoney represents a faltering start in the development of institutional 
competence, TAC represents promise. TAC which was a beneficiary of the jurispru-
dence developed by the Constitutional Court in Grootboom, is a positive marker on 
the willingness and capacity of the Constitutional Court to transcend rhetoric and 
provide tangible remedies for breach of the right to health. TAC shows that courts 
may determine the right to health even where there are budgetary implications. The 
fact that socio-economic rights will almost inevitably give rise to such implications 
limits rather than bars their justiciability. When looked through section 27(2) of the 
Constitution, the right to health is not meaningless. Like its counterparts under inter-
national human rights instruments, it imposes ascertainable and time-laden duties 
albeit within a framework that accommodates peculiar domestic economic circum-
stances, political orientation and history. Disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, 
including women, children, the disabled and elderly should be given due priority.
At the same time the cases show that the Constitutional Court has not thrown 
caution to the wind. The cases show that even where the courts find violations of 
socio-economic rights, courts remain conscious of, rather than oblivious to, their 
limitations in terms of constitutional and institutional competence. Courts are much 
more comfortable issuing declaratory judgments and leaving it to the discretion of the 
executive about how to arrange budgets. At the same time, limitations of institutional 
competence are real. The rejection of the core minimum obligation in Grootboom 
and TAC is a manifestation or acknowledgment of the limitations in this regard.
60 MINISTER of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others, cit., paras 34-35 and 39.
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